The Social Security Court Proposal an Answer to a Critique by Arner, Frederick B.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 4
5-1-1983
The Social Security Court Proposal an Answer to a
Critique
Frederick B. Arner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arner, Frederick B. (1983) "The Social Security Court Proposal an Answer to a Critique," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 10: Iss. 2, Article
4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol10/iss2/4
THE SOCIAL SECURITY COURT PROPOSAL:
AN ANSWER TO A CRITIQUE
Frederick B. Arner*
On March 3, 1982, Representative J.J. Pickle (D-Tx.), Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Ways and Means Social Security of the House
Ways and Means Committee, introduced H.R. 5700,1 which included
provisions for establishing a Social Security Court. The two major ar-
guments for such a court can be stated simply and the issues closely
drawn. First, the court is designed to result in more uniformity in deci-
sion-making by the judiciary and a concomitant increase in uniformity
at all levels of the adjudicative process.2 Second, a Social Security
Court would provide relief to an overburdened federal judiciary and a
vehicle for the effective handling of social security cases.
* Mr. Amer is a consultant to the Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administra-
tion. From 1975 to January 1983 he served as professional staff, Subcommittee on Social
Security, Ways and Means Committee with principal responsibility for the Disability Insur-
ance Program and oversight of administration of the Social Security Program. Previously to
that he served as a Senior Specialist in Social Security Legislation and Chief, Education and
Public Welfare Division, Congressional Research Service. In that capacity he rendered tech-
nical staff assistance to the Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees on Social
Security and Medicare legislation from 1956 to 1973. In 1959 and 1960 he served as Com-
mittee Counsel on the Ways and Means Subcommittee on the administration of the Social
Security Laws which examined the Disability Insurance Program.
A.B., Kenyon College, 1947; LL.B., Harvard and George Washington University Law
Schools, 1953.
This article was written by Mr. Amer in his private capacity. No official support or
endorsement by the Social Security Administration or the Department of Health and Human
Services is intended or should be inferred.
1. H.R. 5700, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H664 (daily ed. March 3, 1982).
2. This argument was summarized by the National Commission on Social Security in its recom-
mendation for the establishment of a Social Security Court:
This new court could make significant improvements in the appeals process. Be-
cause they reviewed only social security cases, judges of the court would acquire an
expertise in the area that judges in Federal District Courts usually lack. By creating a
uniform body of precedential material, the court's decisions would have a significant
effect on the earlier stages of the adjudicative process as well. With all appeals going
to a single court, it could no longer be argued, as it is now, that the need for uniform
nationwide decisions precludes using the sometimes conflicting decisions of the sev-
eral circuit courts as binding precedents.
NAT'L COMM'N ON SOCIAL SECURITY, FINAL REPORT, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S Fu-
TURE 233 (1981). The Commission's recommendation was in response to a request contained
in the Conference report on the Disability Amendments of 1980. H.R. REP. No. 944, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980) (noting the growing number of court cases and the varying inter-
pretations of the law in the judicial circuits).
3. This argument was presented by the Bork Committee in 1977 as follows:
It can only be disheartening for a litigant whose claim requires no more than a
thoughtful and disinterested factfinder to be forced into competition with all other
civil and criminal business for the precious time of an Article III judge. Although
Article III courts are uniquely qualified to protect individual freedoms, interpret Fed-
eral laws, and preserve democratic processes of government--the indispensable func-
tions of the Federal court--they are not unique in their ability to adjudicate relatively
Social Security Court
In the year ending February 1983, Social Security cases pending in
all federal courts increased by thirty-three percent, from 20,375 to
27,112. In the first two months of the 1983 calendar year alone, 3,108
cases were filed and pending cases increased by 2,151 cases. In each of
the last two fiscal years, filings have increased by 3,000 cases. It is esti-
mated that the increase will be even greater in the next two years.4
Mr. J.P. Ogilvy 5 recently criticized the Social Security Court propo-
sal, in an article published in the Journal ofLegislation.6 In that article,
Mr. Ogilvy asserted that the need for a Social Security Court is based
upon "faulty assumptions" and that the two major arguments for the
court do not withstand "close scrutiny." This article will examine those
assertions and the alternatives to a Social Security Court presented by
Mr. Ogilvy.
Ogilvy describes rather thoroughly the court proposal.7  That
description will not be presented again here. The present article should
be read together with Mr. Ogilvy's comprehensive view of the issues
and for his citations to additional relevant materials.
BACKGROUND FOR THE COURT PROPOSAL
The first proposal for similar court legislation was contained in
H.R. 8076, introduced in the 95th Congress.' The major difference be-
tween the two proposals is that H.R. 5700 would create a social secur-
ity, rather than a disability court. The scope of the court's jurisdiction
was expanded in H.R. 5700 to prevent a potentially cumbersome mech-
anism whereby disability issues would have gone to the new court and
non-disability issues would have remained with the district courts. For
instance under H.R. 8076, any case with both insured status and disa-
unsophisticated, repetitious factual issues. Many other kinds of tribunals perform
that function as accurately and as well.
The Committee, therefore, proposes creation of a new system of tribunals that can
handle claims under many Federal welfare and regulatory programs as capably as the
Article III courts and with greater speed and lower cost to litigants. The shifting of
these cases to the new tribunals will also preserve the capacity of the Article III courts
to respond to claims of human freedom and dignity.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS 8-9 (1977).






The 1983 estimate seems very conservative in as much as 8,307 cases have been filed in the
first six months of the 1983 Fiscal Year. SOCIAL SECURITY AD., SOCIAL SECURITY LIrIGA-
TION MONTHLY REPORTS.
5. Consultant, Center for Applied Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law Center, Wash-
ington, D.C.
6. Ogilvy, The Social Security Court Proposal- A Critique, 9 J. LEGIS. 229 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Ogilvy].
7. Id at 232-34.
8. H.R. 8076, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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bility issues would have to have been split. Moreover, the idea of offer-
ing the claimant alternative judicial forums, as is done in tax
legislation, seemed inappropriate for social security cases.9
H.R. 5700 also differs from the earlier version in that it institutes a
more limited appeal to higher Federal Courts. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit would have exclusive jurisdiction.
Appeals to the court of appeals would also be limited to statutory inter-
pretation and constitutional issues.
During the mark-up on H.R. 5700, in March 1982, Chairman Peter
Rodino of the Judiciary Committee requested that the section of the
bill dealing with the Social Security Court and other amendments deal-
ing with court remands and attorneys' fees be stricken from the bill and
addressed jointly by the Judiciary and Ways and Means Committees.
Subsequently, Mr. Rodino said it was too early for hearings and ex-
pressed concern about the constitutionality of the legislation in view of
the case pending before the United States Supreme Court regarding the
Bankruptcy Court. Doubts as to the constitutionality of the Social Se-
curity Court were largely resolved in June, 1982, by the opinion of the
Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Popeline Co., et
al 10 The Social Security Court, like the Tax Court would deal with
"public rights," over which Article III does not bar the jurisdiction of a
specialized court.
LACK OF UNIFORMITY AMONG LEVELS OF ADJUDICATION
Advocates of the Social Security Court proposal maintain that the
new court is necessary to replace federal district courts and courts of
appeals as the reviewing body for administrative decisions involving
Social Security. The proponents of the proposal believe that a Social
Security Court, unlike its predecessors, will provide more uniform deci-
9. This appears in accord with the views of Chairman Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) of the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, which shares jurisdiction over H.R. 5700. Rep. Kastenmeier
writes that there "should only be a choice of one forum per litigant." Kastenmeier & Rem-
ington, Court Reform andAccess To Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
301 (1979).
10. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). Justice Brennan's opinion states:
The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively
explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present case, for it
suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the
government and others.'. . . In contrast, 'the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined,' Crowel v. Benson, 285 U.S., at 51, is a matter of private
rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category
may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administra-
tive agencies for their determination. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
Comm'n, 430 U.S., at 450 n.7; Crowell v. Benson, supra at 50-51. See also Katz,
Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REv. 894, 917-918 (1930). Private-rights dis-
putes on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.
102 S. Ct. at 2870-71. A constitutional challenge was rejected by the Tax Court itself on the
basis of Supreme Court decisions approving authority in Congress to create non-Article III
courts to adjudicate cases involving the Government as a party. Burns, Stix Friedman and
Co., 57 T.C. 392 (1971).
[Vol. 10:324
Social Security Court
sion-making. Mr. Ogilvy believes that assertions of lack of uniformity
in case law overstate the case and, even if true, may not be that impor-
tant a consideration.
Mr. Ogilvy agrees that there is a lack of uniformity in decision-
making among and within the various levels of adjudication-the state
agencies, the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), and the courts."I He is
quick to emphasize, however, that decisional inconsistencies are greater
at the administrative level' 2 and that the differences in judicial opinions
may not indicate a problem, but instead may be "the healthy function-
ing of an independent judiciary."13 Mr. Olgilvy maintains that the
courts "have been remarkably uniform in their legal interpretation of
the Act."' 4 This assertion is questioned by proponents of the Social
Security Court.
The great diversity of adjudicative result at all levels of the review
process, including those of the federal courts, is responsible for confu-
sion and uncertainty in the disability area. Two basic elements of the
present review process contribute to this result: (1) the necessity of ap-
plying a broad standard of disability to individuals with diverse im-
pairments and widely varying vocational and educational
backgrounds, and (2) a multi-layered adjudication and appeals system
which by its very nature leads to uneven results. This diversity which
results from definitional and structural reasons has been compounded
by some Courts and ALJ's who make independent policy judgments
under authority they see as flowing from their role as an "independent
judiciary."' 5 It is a basic premise of the Social Security Court proposal
that uniformity and independent court review are not necessarily in-
compatible and that a specialized court will be better able to balance
these elements than the present system. Since 1960, the Ways and
Means Committee has wrestled with these problems. The Social Secur-
ity Court proposal is just one facet of these attempts to achieve more
uniform decisionmaking. 16
11. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 234.
12. Id at 234 n. 40.
13. ld at 236.
14. Id at 235-36.
15. The view of the proper role of the AL's and the Court in determining policy varies greatly.
Some examples of Court decisions which fill policy vacuums or actually override policy posi-
tions established by the SSA are set forth subsequently in this article. There are other more
restrictive views, however, indicating that both the AL's and the courts should exercise great
restraint in the policy area. See J. MAsHAw, C. GoErTz, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, D.
VERKIL, & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SEcuRITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 121 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as CENTER REPORT]. A case of a court exercising such restraint is Cummins v.
Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81 (1982).
16. These attempts have been of a legislative and oversight nature starting with a Ways and
Means Subcommittee study in 1959 and continuing through the reporting of H.R. 5700 in
1982. The 1959 Subcommittee report focused on the definition of disability to the extent that
it called for the Social Security Administration to develop more specific criteria for the eval-
uation of the non-medical factors. SUBCOMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY, ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM,
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (1960). These efforts
eventually resulted in the so-called vocational 'grid' regulations in 1979, 20 C.F.R. § 404,
19831
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Court Decisions as Precedents
Mr. Ogilvy argues that there "is no reason to suppose that the deci-
sions of the Social Security Court will have any more value or accept-
ance as precedent that the decisions of the present reviewing courts."' 7
However, having said that, he seems to worry that there may be more
uniformity as a result of the proposal. He states that proponents "as-
sume that a single Social Security Court will issue uniform and consis-
tent decisions which will not differ from interpretation of the law by the
Secretary," and that this "assumption seems to be unrealistically opti-
mistic at best, and highly undesirable at worst."'18 He states that the
Social Security Court is "designed to assure the issuance of internally
consistent opinions intended to have precedential effect in subsequent
cases" but points out that "nothing in the law requires the Secretary to
acquiesce in the decisions of the court."' 9
Proponents assume that the Secretary will be bound by the deci-
sions of the court which he may appeal, although he may change the
regulations or request that Congress change the law. That the court's
decisions bind the Secretary presumably would happen by operation of
law under the proposal, but perhaps it should be explicitly stated in the
legislation or in the legislative history. It is certainly reasonable to be-
lieve that there should not be an acquiescence problem with a Social
Security Court.
Eileen Sweeney, Staff Attorney, National Senior Citizen Law
App. 2 (1982), which are followed by the State agencies, the AL's, and some of the courts.
The Committee in the Social Security Amendments of 1967 spelled out legislatively some of
the administrative criteria which were being disregarded by some Courts by interpreting the
definition in such a way as to overly emphasize local job availability rather than capability to
do work which exists in the 'national economy.' The Committee report noted the "growing
body of court interpretation of the statute which, if followed in the administration of the
disability provisions could result in substantial further increases in costs in the future." H.R.
REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967). Concern with the quality and uniformity of
decision-making increased greatly after the implementation of the SSI disability program in
the mid-1970's and the increasing actuarial problems in the disability insurance program.
These concerns culminated with the Disability Amendments of 1980 which addressed the
problems of quality and uniformity by increasing "direct Federal management control over
how disability determinations are made in the State agencies and by requiring increased
Federal review of State determinations." H.R. REP. No. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979).
The legislation included the Bellmon Amendment which expressed concern with ALJ deci-
sion-making and required that the Secretary of Health and Human Services institute a pro-
gram of "own-motion review and to report to Congress on the program." The Conference
Report stated that "the variance in reversal rates among ALJs and high overall ALJ reversals
of determinations made at the pre-hearing level indicated that there is a need for such re-
view." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 57-58 (1979).
The Secretary's subsequent report found that there were major differences in the results
of A.J and State agency decisions and that a "significant contributing factor" to these differ-
ences was that the two levels were using different standards. H.R. 6181 as reported by the
Ways and Means Committee contains a provision, in section 7, stating that the "Secretary
shall assure that uniform standards are applied at all levels of adjudication." The report
noted with approval the Secretary's intention to issue Social Security Rulings which will be
binding on all levels of adjudication. The first set of these Rulings was issued in December,
1982. (SSR 82-50 to SSR 82-69).
17. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 243.
18. Id
19. Id
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Center, believes, as do many other social security claimant representa-
tives, that "this practice (of 'non-acquiescence') is clearly illegal.""0
She states that the "creation of a 'Social Security Court' is unnecessary
and essentially rewards the Social Security Administration for its years
of arrogant disregard of court rulings." Sweeney concludes that the
"SSA should be required to follow the law for a few years and then
Congress should come back and re-evaluate the need for a social secur-
ity court." If the Social Security Administration (SSA) acquiesced in
every circuit court decision, however, there would be chaos in case law
precedent throughout the country. These conflicting precedents would,
in varying degrees, filter back to the ALJ's, causing further lack of uni-
formity among the decision makers. Some might argue that this may
be beneficial to individual claimants, but uniformity in a national bene-
fits program would undoubtedly suffer. Perhaps the area where the
government performance can be faulted most validly, in addition to
their failure to appeal more cases, is where SSA ignores circuit court
decisions and does not indicate by ruling that they either approve or
disapprove. In this situation, the ALJ's are caught between agency pol-
icy and contrary judicial pronouncement in the circuit where they sit.
The most extensive study of the problem of following judicial pro-
nouncements is contained in a report by the National Center for Ad-
ministrative Justice." The Center report examines the arguments on
20. Hearings on H.. 5700 before the Subcommr on Social Security of the House Comn. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 217-18 (1982). Ms. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, National Se-
nior Citizens Law Center, was testifying on behalf of the Gray Panthers and the Legislative
Council of Older Americans.
21. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15. The study was done under contract with the SSA at the
recommendation of the Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. REP. No. 679, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1975). The question of how the SSA deals with court decisions has long been of
concern to Congress and other interested parties. Basically, the SSA maintains that a district
or circuit court decision is binding only in the specific case it decides. The SSA may acqui-
esce in adverse court decisions by issuing a regulation or ruling, binding upon components.
If a court decision establishes certain procedural or evidentiary requirements, the adminis-
trative law judge is required to make a reasonable effort to follow the court's view when
handling similar cases. However, if a district or circuit court's decision contains interpreta-
tions of the law and regulations which are inconsistent with the Secretary's interpretation of
policy, the State agencies and the administrative law judges are to follow the Secretary's
interpretation.
Unhappiness with this policy is illustrated by the reaction to the SSA's recent treatment
of the decision in Finnegan v. Mathews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), which dealt with the
termination of grandfathered SSI recipients and whether a showing of medical improvement
need be shown. A Social Security Ruling of non-acquiescence was issued which stated that
the proper standard was that stated in the regulation and not that stated by the court. Soc.
Sec. Rul. 82-10c (Jan. 1982).
The question of whether medical improvement needs to be shown in termination cases is
another illustration of differing circuit court interpretation. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently handed down a decision that an action to terminate benefits was not
based on substantial evidence when the claimant continued to manifest the same impair-
ments and consequent pain that resulted in the initial award of benefits. Simpson v.
Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (1 lth Cir. 1982); but see Torres v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir.
1982) and Crosby v. Schweiker, 650 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981) which state that the burden of
proof is on the claimant at all times including a termination proceeding. For a full discus-
sion of the medical improvement issue see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTINUING DISABILITY INVESTIGATION PROGRAM; BACKGROUND AND
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both sides of the Social Security Court issue and concludes that the
need for decisional uniformity does not "convincingly justify SSA's
persistent refusal to acquiesce. . . even on a circuit-by-circuit basis."22
The Center's report states:
An acquiescence should, as under present practice, be published as a
Social Security Ruling. Nonacquiescence, however, should also be an-
nounced and, wherever feasible, accompanied by a statement setting
forth reasons for the agency's decision. Such a statement would serve
several purposes. It would advise ALJs and the Appeals Council how
the particular judicial precedent should be treated in future cases. It
might help to reassure district and circuit judges that their holdings
were not lightly or arbitrarily ignored. Most important, the duty to
prepare a reasoned explanation of why the agency had decided neither
to appeal nor to acquiesce would force SSA officials to confront the
issue squarely rather than brush it off with a routine quiet
nonacquiescence.23
The report also states that consideration should also be given to
changing the criteria and directing the "ALJs to follow local judicial
precedent on all issues (not merely 'procedural and evidentiary mat-
ters') when not inconsistent with regulations, Social Security Rulings,
explicit nonacquiescences, or other authoritative pronouncements. '24
H.R. 5700 provides a mechanism to effectuate internal consistency
in decisions of the Social Security Court and to insure that the deci-
sions have precedental effect throughout the various levels of review.
The bill provides that the decision of one judge becomes the decision of
the full court within thirty days. However, within this period, the chief
judge can direct that the decision be reviewed by a panel of at least
three of the-judges. The decision of the panel shall "be the decision of
the Social Security Court. ' 25 A similar procedure has helped assure
internal consistency in tax court decision making. 26 H.R. 5700 also
requires the court to publish all decisions which the chief judge deter-
mines should serve as precedent in subsequent cases.
The "uniform interpretation" examples which Ogilvy cites appear
to be instances where the courts have either not followed agency policy
regulations or merely filled a policy vacuum. There is a substantial
LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, H.R. Doc. No. 37, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 24-28 (Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as DISABILITY INVESTIGATION].
22. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 113.
23. Id at 114-15.
24. d at 115.
25. § 1130(a)(4).
26. This is the so called conference system. The Tax Court legislation states that review shall be
by the "Tax Court." Harold Dubroff in his work on the Tax Court states:
"The court conference is a distinct feature of Tax Court procedure. In large part, it
justifies the assertion that the Tax Court is a single, national court, not sixteen sepa-
rate courts (the division of the court). Notwithstanding occasional misunderstandings
on the part of the observers as to the nature of conference review, the conference
procedure generally has been praised for its role in providing uniformity in Tax Court
opinions."
H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATE TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 352-53 (1979).
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concern over whether this degree of policy independence is in accord
with congressional intent. The 1974 staff report of the Ways and
Means Committee gives the following background:
The definition of disability is phrased in broad language and the
legislative reports which accompanied the enactment of the definition
in 1954 and 1956 supplied few guidelines for its interpretation. The
Harrison Subcommittee believed that the Social Security Administra-
tion was following the 'pragmatic approach advocated by the Advisory
Council on Social Security to the Senate Committee on Finance
(1949)-a legislative definition written in rather broad terms to be im-
plemented by more specific administrative regulations on the basis of
operational experience.!
The subcommittee went on to say that at that time (1960) 'the de-
velopment of operational "case law" has been going on for some time,
but very little of it, thus far, has been made public in the form of regu-
lations.' The subcommittee believed that lack of precedent materials
in the form of regulations or agency rulings was leaving a vacuum and
'the distinct possibility exists that if the situation remains unchanged
the courts rather than the Department or Congress will set the stan-
dards.' Some of these concerns the subcommittee stated might well
affect the actuarial status of the disability program.27
Mr. Ogilvy also declares that there would be "pressure upon the
court to develop general and broadly applicable rules at the expense of
careful, individualized consideration of the cases."28 It is not readily
apparent why Social Security Court judges, as opposed to district
judges, would make less careful or individualized decisions. Mr.
Ogilvy and other opponents are saying perhaps that Social Security
Court judges would not be as free to make "individualized" judgments
as to the policy of the program.
It appears that many courts have refused to follow SSA policy and
regulation and that there has been a lack of uniformity in how they are
interpreted throughout the country. The proclivities of the courts to
substitute their own policy judgments are often prefaced by the state-
ment that the Social Security Act is "remedial in nature."29 Mr.
Ogilvy, in illustrating a different point, quotes Professor Jerry L.
Mashaw to the effect that it "is his belief that liberal decisions by dis-
trict court judges and judges in the courts of appeals [for the Fourth
and Sixth Circuits] have made the disability program into a regional
27. STAFF OF COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (Comm. Print 1974).
28. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 244.
29. This concept which apparently sees inherent and somewhat mysterious equity powers to deal
with Social Security cases seems to be shared to some degree by Ogilvy who states that the
"rate of reversals and remands may be a positive force in effectuating the remedial legislative
intent underlying the Social Security Act." Id at 248. This view of inherent "remedial"
power is not limited to the Courts. The Ways and Means Committee report on H.R. 6181
states "it appears that substantial numbers of ALJs are not following the regulations in al-
lowing cases under a special [category of] residual functional capacity less than sedentary."
H.R. REP. No. 588, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982).
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unemployment program for miners.' 3 °
Kerner Decision-Changing Burden of Proof
Mr. Ogilvy cites specific areas of jurisprudence to buttress his asser-
tion that principles of law are "remarkably" uniform." He notes the
famous Kerner v. leming32 decision and the caselaw on pain. The
1960 Kerner case is an illustration of the courts occupying a policy vac-
uum. Kerner made a substantive change in the program by imposing
the burden of proof on the government to show the availability of work
after the claimant had shown he could not do his usual work.33 When
the government finally and reluctantly acquiesced in Kerner in the late
1960's, a massive use of vocational specialists was needed to meet the
new burden of proof requirement.34
This administrative burden, in part, led to the promulgation of the
vocational "grid" regulation in 1978. The vocational grid was an at-
tempt to provide uniform standards regarding the availability of jobs,
using administrative notice rather than individual expert witnesses.35
In Fiscal Year 1978-1979, vocational experts were used in about forty
percent of the ALJ cases.36 This declined to thirteen percent in 1980,
but is again increasing. In theory, under the new regulations, the use of
vocational experts should have been virtually eliminated. However,
some courts of appeals fail to follow the regulation and still require "in
person expert" testimony by vocational specialists in certain situations.
The validity of the vocational grid regulations is before the Supreme
Court this term.37 This is another illustration of divergent circuit court
opinions interpretating existing law.
30. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 239 n.52.
31. Id at 236 n.42.
32. Kerner v. Fleming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
33. Id at 921. The Ways and Means staff print, supra note 27, gives a full description of this
process in the chapter headed: Standards and Definition of Disability: Who Sets Them--The
Congress, the Social Security Administration or the Courts at 45-55.
34. In 1965, vocational experts were used in 5,086 cases; in 1970, 8,722; in 1975, 23,303; and
peaking at a rate of 91,667 cases in 1978. In Fiscal Year 1979, there was a decrease of 40,000
to 54,104 cases. There was another decrease to 32,866 cases in Fiscal Year 1980, but these
cases have increased to about 40,000 cases each in 1981 and 1982.
35. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2 (1982).
36. 5 OHA L. REP. 2 (Oct. 1981).
37. Schweiker v. CampbelL"No. 81-1983 on writ of certiorari from the Second Circuit decision,
665 F.2d 48. A Social Security ruling of non-acquiescence has been issued which is applica-
ble to all circuits. But cf. Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351 (1Ith Cir. 1982),petition for cert.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (1982) (regulations if properly applied are within Secretary's
rulemaking powers and do not contravene claimant's right to a hearing).
The Supreme Court decided Campbell (sub nom. Heckler v. Campbell) on May 16, 1983.
In it's decision upholding the use of the medical-vocational guidelines, the Court stated that
[The] principle of administrative law-that when an agency takes official or adminis-
trative notice of facts, a litigant must be given an adequate opportunity to respond
... is inapplicable (in this case), however, when the agency has promulgated valid
regulations. Its pqrpose is to provide a procedural safeguard: to ensure the accuracy
of the facts of which an agency takes notice. But when the accuracy of those facts
already has been tested fairly during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself
provides sufficient procedural protection.
... We think the Secretary reasonably could choose to rely on these [medical-
[Vol. 10:324
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Substantial Evidence Rule and Court Remands
Equally important to the uniform application of legal principles is
interpretation of procedural aspects of the program which have sub-
stantive implications. It seems reasonable to assume that a Social Se-
curity Court could effectuate a more uniform interpretation of
substantial evidence rule. Mr. Ogilvy deals rather summarily with this
rule, stating that:
It is doubtful that the present method of judicial review of final
administrative decisions results in significant variations in principles or
outcomes. Most district court reversals are based simply on the ab-
sence of substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision; they
announce no rules or principles of general application.
3 8
A major study by the National Law Center of George Washington
University dealt with the problems of the substantial evidence rule and
in this context raises the question of the advisability of creating a spe-
cialized court. This study found that "the social security disability in-
surance benefits program and its great reliance upon medical evidence
may indicate the need for a redefinition of the 'substantial evidence'
rule to be applied in the judicial review of Social Security Administra-
tion findings.39 Moreover, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., wrote in his highly
publicized study for the Administrative Conference in 1973 that
"neither the initial congressional definition of disability nor the re-defi-
nition of 1967 seems to be administratively manageable if the courts
ignore the substantial evidence rule."'
In 1979 the Carter Administration recommended that the law be
amended to eliminate the Federal courts' review of factual determina-
tions under the "substantial evidence rule."'" Health and Human
vocational] guidelines in appropriate cases rather than on the testimony of a voca-
tional expert in each case.
Slip op. at 11-12.
38. Oglivy, supra note 6, at 236-37.
39. GOLDSBOROUGH, TINSLEY & STEINBERG, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: AN IN-
TER-DISCIPLINARY STUDY OF DISABILITY EVALUATION, pt. II, at 7-27 (an unpublished paper
at the Graduate School of Public Law, National Law Center of George Washington Univer-
sity). An excerpt from this study on the substantial evidence rule is contained in the 1974
Staff print, supra note 27, at 83-93. Although done under contract to the Social Security
Administration in 1963, it still provides a timely commentary on the problems of various
judicial interpretations of the substantial evidence rule.
40. R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MASS JUSTICE-A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION
51 (1973).
41. The Social Security Administration has made numerous complaints over the years that many
courts had shown lack of restraint in substituting their judgment of the facts instead of apply-
ing what the SSA considers the proper interpretation of the substantial evidence rule. For
example, in answer to a question in the Ways and Means Committee Staff study in 1974 the
Social Security Administration pointed to the difficulties in appealing such cases which con-
tinued "to place great weight on subjective complaints and make independent evaluations of
the evidence." They pointed out that:
The fact that the court had readjudicated the case on the evidence of record is
usually not a basis for a recommendation to seek appellate review, even where the
court seems to have disregarded the substantial evidence rule. Appeal is recom-
mended in cases where serious program implications and a strong factual record
exists.
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Services Secretary Joseph Califano, in reply to a written question from
the Social Security Subcommittee, stated that the substantial evidence
rule has not worked well in the past.42  He argued that
[The] task of reviewing the facts of individual cases in a mass benefits
program like DI or SSI is neither appropriate for the federal courts nor
necessary to assure fairness to claimants. . . . Because of the large
number of cases and. . . that each one turns on its facts, the govern-
ment rarely appeals these cases. The result is haphazard intervention
by Federal district judges for the benefit of a small minority of
claimants.
4 3
The Subcommittee on Social Security, however, rejected the Carter
Administration's recommendation for elimination of the "substantial
evidence rule."'  The Administration pursued a different approach to
the problem when H.R. 3236 was before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee. Social Security Commissioner Stanford Ross recommended that
the stricter standard of "arbitrary and capricious" be substituted for
"substantial evidence" in Court review of factual determinations.45
This recommendation was adopted by the Finance Committee.' How-
ever, the Conference Committee rejected the new standard.
The conference agreement deletes the provisions of the Senate bill be-
The Staff commented that 'it was not altogether convinced that the chronic disregarding of
the substantial evidence rule does not have "serious policy implications" and that ignoring
these District court cases is the policy to be pursued.' The Staff concluded:
The preceding commentary acknowledges the difficulty in dealing with the situation,
but the staff believes that the Social Security Administration has an obligation of
candidly presenting to the Committee an outline of the basic problem. If it turns out
to be one where lack of judicial restraint is a primary element, perhaps the Judicial
Conference or other scholars on the judiciary can be consulted on appropriate reme-
dial action. Commentators have noted the propensity of the courts to examine de
novo those areas where they believe they have more expertise. Thus, courts may be
more likely to look closely at disability cases than the cases from regulatory agencies
which have complex economic issues. On the other hand, if the problem turns out to
be primarily one of lack of adequate definitional criteria, this conclusion should be
communicated to the Committee. The amount of social security disability litigation
alone would appear to justify this scrutiny.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 81.
42. Disability Insurance Legislation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the
House Comm on Ways andMeans, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1979).
43. Id
44. Chairman Kastenmeier of the Judiciary Subcommittee applauded the rejection of this at-
tempt to "ration" judicial resources, pointing out that the proposal did not provide an "alter-
native forum such as a specialized disability review tribunal 'to correct errors resulting from
existing administrative mechanism' which are not reputed to work very well." Kastenmeier
& Remington, supra note 9, at 332-33.
45. Social Security Act Disability Program Amendments: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1979).
46. The Finknce Committee report noted the dramatic growth in disability court cases and
stated:
In theory, the 'substantial evidence rule' imposed on the courts contrasts the review at
the level with those conducted within the administrative process of the Social Security
Administration in which cases are reviewed 'de novo.' Complaints have long been
made by the Social Security Administration and others that the courts have fre-
quently by-passed the substantial evidence rule by substituting their judgment of the
facts for those agency adjudicators.
S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1979).
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cause of the uncertainty as to the ramifications of the rule proposed
and the concern that the administrative process is not operating with
the degree of credibility which would justify elimination of the 'sub-
stantial evidence rule'...
The conference committee would like to reiterate what both com-
mittees stated in their reports on Public Law 94-202 that the courts
should interpret the substantial evidence rule with strict adherence to
its principles since the practice of some courts in making de novo fac-
tual determinations could result in very seriousIroblems for the Fed-
eral judiciary and the social security programs.
Proponents believe that "strict adherence" to or at least the uniform
application of the substantial evidence rule has a much better chance of
being accomplished by a Social Security Court than by the present
system.
Similarly, more uniform guidelines on the use of court remands
would almost have to result from a Social Security Court. As with the
substantial evidence rule, remands have been a very useful vehicle for
district court judges who disagree with administrative decisions but are
not willing to reverse or even deal with the cases. The Center for Ad-
ministrative Justice report states that while "the substantial evidence
test narrowly circumscribes the power of the courts to enter final judg-
ments in favor of the claimant, the companion good cause provision
gives them an almost unbounded discretion to set aside the administra-
tive decision and order an enlargement of the record. '4  Congress, in
the 1980 Amendments, cited the Center's report49 and attempted to
remedy this situation by adding to the "good cause" provision a re-
quirement that the Social Security Court's remand would be authorized
only upon a showing that there is new material evidence and that there
was good cause for failure to incorporate it into the record in a prior
proceeding.50 Experience under the 1980 Amendments remand provi-
sion, however, does not indicate any great change in the performance
of the district courts.51
47. H.R. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1979).
48. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 132-33. The Center Report stated:
Those who lament the fact that district judges often seem to disregard the substan-
tial evidence test should put that concern in perspective. While the substantial evi-
dence test narrowly circumscribes the power of the courts to enter final judgements in
favor of the claimant, the companion good cause provision gives them an almost un-
bounded discretion to set aside the administrative decision and order an enlargement
of the record. The judge who believes that the weight of the record evidence favors
the claimant but cannot in good conscience reverse under the substantial evidence
test; or the judge who believes that the weight of the evidence supports the Secretary's
denial but that the administrative record itself does not reflect all of the relevant facts;
or the judge who believes that representation by counsel is an essential ingredient of
due process but is unwilling to hazard a constitutional ruling that could be tested on
appeal-all may use the good cause provision as a convenient basis for securing an
administrative reevaluation.
Id
49. H.R. REP. No. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979).
50. Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 307, 94 Stat. 441,458 (1980). This section also amended the Secretary's
unrestricted power to have a case remanded before an answer had been filed.
51. Remands to administrative levels numbered under 2,000 cases in 1975-1976, but increased to
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Mr. Ogilvy acknowledges that "the federal district courts contribute
to delay to the extent that they remand matters to the Secretary for
further study rather than affirming or reversing outright the decision of
the Secretary. '5 2 He points out, however, that the Social Security Court
proposal also contains remand authority, even though Ogilvy does in-
dicate the possibility that the Social Security Court might issue fewer
remands. 3 Proponents of the court proposal would argue that the cur-
rent remand authority, similar to "substantial evidence rule," is more
controllable by a Social Security Court. Other, more radical changes
such as eliminating court remand authority might not be necessary. 4
Evaluation of Pain
The view that court decisions are uniform as to the evaluation of
pain is directly contrary to the view of the SSA and the Ways and
Means Committee, which has proposed a uniform directive on how to
evaluate it. 5 The need for such a directive would not be as great, pre-
sumably, if a Social Security Court were in full operation. At the very
least, Congress would only need to focus on the case law developed in a
single court.
One of the rationales for appeal from the Social Security Court to
the District of Columbia Circuit is avoidance of the situation where,
even with a statutory provision, there would be multiple circuit court
interpretations for evaluating pain.
Ogilvy argues that the various decisions on pain are relatively uni-
form. 6 This uniformity, however, is not so apparent. For instance,
Lund v. Weinberger,57 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has handed down a decision which is being interpreted
throughout the circuit as standing for the proposition that if there is no
factual basis in the record to reject subjective complaints of pain then a
finding of disability is justified.58 Thus, in this circuit, the government
approximately 3,700 in 1979. They decreased slightly in 1980-1981, but have returned to an
all time high of over 3,700. In March of 1983 there were 5,218 court cases on remand which
was 1,400 greater than in March of 1982. SSA, SOCIAL SEcunrTy LITIGATION MONTHLY
REPORT (Mar. 1983). Secretary initiated remands, however, have declined substantially.
52. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 246.
53. Id at 246 n.100.
54. H.R. 5700 contained a provision which would have repealed court remand authority entirely.
55. The report on H.R. 6181 states:
The social security law has never been explicit about how pain should be evalu-
ated in making social security disability determinations. This has resulted in deci-
sions in some cases, especially at the ALJ level, being based on subjective reports of
pain. These decisions often reflect the district and circuit court decisions on pain
which vary throughout the country.
H.R. REP. No. 588, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982).
56. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 237 n.44.
57. Lund v. Weinberger, 520 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1975).
58. The Court stated:
Since there is no factual basis in the record upon which the ALJ could reject
Lund's testimony .. , his subjective complaints, which may serve as the basis for a
disability award, .. stand unrebutted. None of the medical reports are inconsistent
with the complaints and, as noted, three of the reports contain corroborating opinions
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must rebut a presumption of disability for each claimant who subjec-
tively alleges pain. This and other court decisions seem contrary to the
provisions of the 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act.
59
The Second and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, follow the statute
and regulations to the effect that the source of pain must be established
by anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities demon-
strable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic tech-
niques. These courts then go on to state that the degree or extent of the
severity of this pain need not necessarily be proven by such techniques.
Such cases hold that the subjective statements of a claimant as to the
disabling severity of his or her pain may serve as a basis for establish-
ing disability, even if this testimony or other subjective evidence of
pain is unaccompanied by verifying clinical findings or other objective
medical evidence confirming the pain's disabling severity.60
CASELOAD BURDEN OF FEDERAL COURTS
Mr. Ogilvy states that the burden of social security cases is not "ac-
celerating," rather that the problem is shrinking. 61 He declares that
"after a dramatic increase in filings during the year ending June 30,
1976, there has been a steady decline in the number of filings each
year."' 62 In this regard, we have over two more years of statistics than
those used by Ogilvy which show that social security court case disposi-
by doctors who examined Lund. We think under these circumstances, the rejection
by the hearing examiner of the evidence of disabling headaches was arbitrary and
contrary to substantial evidence of record ...
Id at 785.
59. Section 223(d)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1976), states:
For the purposes of this subsection, a 'physical or mental impairment' is an impair-
ment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.
The Report on the 1967 Amendment stated:
The impairment which is the basis for the disability must result from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown to exist through the
use of medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Statements
of the applicant or conclusions by others with respect to the nature or extent of im-
pairment or disability do not establish the existence of disability for purposes of social
security benefits based on disability unless that are supported by clinical or laboratory
findings or other medically acceptable evidence confirming such statements or
conclusion.
H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1967).
60. Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1979). But cf Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 82
(2d Cir. 1983); and Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d (6th Cir. 1978).
61. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 238.
62. Id at 210. As his footnote indicates, the 1976 high was due to about 5,000 "Black Lung"
filings that year. In the last four years, Black Lung filings have averaged only about 200 per
year. In absolute numbers the social security district court filings have increased from 1792
in 1971 to 12,812 in 1982 while total civil filings for these years have increased from 93,396 to
206,193. Filings were relatively stable during the period 1971-1975 but then jumped mark-
edly in 1976-1977 from 3,053 to 8,530. There was only a slight increase in filings during
1978-1979 and an actual decline in 1980 to under 9,000 cases. In 1972 Social Security filings
were only two percent of total filing of civil cases. For the year ending June 1982, they are
six percent. ANNUAL REPORT OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1972-1982.
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tions are not keeping pace with the dramatic increase in social security
filings.63 Moreover, a flood of disability benefit termination cases are
making their way through the administrative levels and will soon begin
to have an impact on the federal judiciary.' 4
Mr. Ogilvy's court statistics only go through the year ending June
1980. At that time there were about 9,000 case filings annually (includ-
ing Medicare) and the number of pending cases stood at 13,154.65 At
the end of calendar 1982 there had been 13,188 cases filed that year
(not including Medicare) and pendings stood at 24,941.66 The burden
is real and accelerating.
Mr. Ogilvy argues that uneven distribution of filings throughout the
country suggests "the opportunity and advisability of tailoring local so-
lutions"'67 rather than the creation of a Social Security Court. He
states:
Social security cases do not create substantial caseload burdens in a
clear majority of the districts; the means adopted to alleviate the actual
burdens should not be predicated on false assumptions of universal or
uniform problems.
68
The most recent statistics, however, indicate a substantial growth of
social security cases having national dimensions.
69
Moreover, it is difficult to see how ability to control a heavy and
uneven workload cannot be seen as an argument for the Social Security
Court. Certainly the federal judiciary has not to date been up to the
task. Uneven caseloads have been characteristic of the social security
cases throughout the history of the disability program. It seems axio-
matic that a centrally organized specialized court could allocate its re-
sources in such a manner that the huge backlogs in some districts could
be eliminated or, at the very least, equally distributed nationally.
To illustrate the backlog, just last spring, the author of this article
spoke with a woman from Eastern Kentucky whose attorney had told
her that it would be three or four years before the district court would
decide her case. To verify this situation, that Court's Administrative
Office did a computer run which indicated that the attorney's informa-
tion was basically correct. Further, Chairman J.J. Pickle (D-Tx.) stated
in the introductory statement on H.R. 5700 that:
There is a very substantial variation between judicial districts in dispo-
sition time which goes to the very heart of the question of whether
justice is being served by the current system. The median disposition
63. See supra note 4.
64. It is estimated that termination cases alone may increase filings by 2,000 court cases in the
current fiscal year and by about 4,000 cases in subsequent years.
65. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 238. ANNUAL REPORT OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, 1972-1982, Table C 3A.
66. SSA Civil Litigation Monthly Report (Dec. 1982). See supra note 4. At the present rate of
increase, pending cases will reach 30,000 by the summer of 1983. Id
67. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 239.
68. Id
69. See supra note 4.
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for cases in the Northern District of West Virginia was 12 months for
the year ending June 30, 1981, which was the median time nationwide.
However, the median time for the Southern District of West Virginia
was 54 months and 10 percent of the cases had been pending 69
months. Why these disparities occur is not altogether clear but a Social
Security Court would be free to concentrate on their removal which
apparently the district court system in not.
70
Mr. Ogilvy points out that magistrates are increasingly being used
to dispose of social security cases.71 A provision authorizing their use is
also contained in the Social Security Court bill.72 Ogilvy notes that
some of the heavy workload districts still do not use them." However,
if it is determined that the increased use of magistrates is desirable in
meeting workload requirements, it would still seem reasonable that a
Social Security Court could more effectively implement such a policy
for their uniform use.
Spokespersons for legal advocacy groups seem to down play the de-
lays in case decisions at the court level. Eileen Sweeney, of the Senior
Citizens Law Center, believes that the court is unnecessary since the
real delays are at the administrative level. She testified during the
March 1982 Ways and Means Committee hearings that:
It is not uncommon for appellants to experience delays of up to six
months at the reconsideration level alone. And, SSA has done every-
thing in its power to assure that delays of up to six months will con-
tinue at the ALJ level.74
Sweeney also states that the SSA contributes to the delay by chroni-
cally asking for extensions of time for filing their replies to claimants.
75
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the government has sixty
days to file a reply and, although precise statistics are lacking, the gov-
ernment often asks for an extension. In most cases the courts are grant-
ing them on a pro forma basis. In those districts which do not grant
extensions, or grant only short ones, the government must devote addi-
tional resources, which may be taken away from the courts in districts
more lenient in granting extensions. The situation is somewhat akin to
the Blankenshp 76 type of court decisions where various federal courts
70. 127 CONG. REc. H635 (March 3, 1982).
71. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 239.
72. They are called Commissioners in H.R. 5700 § 1130(e)(3) following terminology used by the
tax court.
73. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 239 n.60.
74. Supra note 20, at 217.
75. Id at 218.
76. A district court in Kentucky imposed a 90-day limit on hearing cases at a time when ALJ
average processing time was about 220 days. The Government appealed the decision saying
that such an order could not be implemented and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal in
Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (1978), vacated the decision saying that,
although 220 days was not reasonable, neither was 90 days under the circumstances. The
court stated "that elaboration of the 'reasonable time' requirement by rule-making is the
preferable remedy" and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to HEW to
come up with some regulations "to remedy the problem of unreasonable delay." On August
26, 1980, the Department submitted the regulations to the district court proposing a 165-day
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have attempted to impose time limits on AL decision-making. Both
situations would appear to be aided by a specialized court where a pol-
icy on filing time extensions and administrative level adjudication time
limits could be made relatively uniform throughout the country. In
this regard the Social Security Court would enhance the principle of
equal justice under the law.
FUNCTIONS, GOALS AND VALUES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Mr. Ogilvy presents a rather elaborate statement of the "functions,
goals, or values of judicial review,"77 and applies them to the proposed
Social Security Court. His analysis is based almost exclusively on the
Center report, which contains a lengthy discussion of judicial review of
social security cases.78 Mr. Ogilvy states, as does the Center report, that
the "principal benefit of judicial review is the added accuracy it may
impart to the claims determination process. ' 79 This is accomplished by
the corrective function and the regulative function, the "in terrorem
effect" 0 and the precedential effect. Ogilvy stated that the Social Se-
curity Court would not adequately accomplish these goals."1
Mr. Ogilvy ignores, however, that the Center report also applied
these criteria to the current judicial system and concluded that the pres-
ent system "does not paint a very cheerful picture." 2 Moreover, the
report stated that the Center's analysis "permits the conclusion that a
disability court could be constructed to capture most of the best fea-
tures of the existing review scheme, while avoiding most of the
pitfalls." 3
The Center report states that as to the creation of a uniform body of
law the Article III reviewing structure is necessary to some degree be-
cause these cases must be finally resolved at the Supreme Court level.
The report further states, however, that it is not clear that the district
and appeals Article III courts are needed to funnel appropriate Social
Security cases to the Supreme Court and that a disability court seems to
have "clear advantages" over "a federal judiciary that is institutionally
incapable of producing uniform precedents through Supreme Court re-
view of any but the most significant issues of interpretation."8 " The
Center report declares that the Article I court [Social Security Court]
limit. After numerous motions and briefs on both sides as to the reasonableness of the regu-
lation, the District Court on February 17, 1982 ordered the Secretary to publish regulations
within 60 days containing a 180 day hearing time limit and to provide interim benefits to
class members 30 days after the 180 day period expires. The Government has appealed the
decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and a decision is pending.
77. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 241.
78. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 125-50.
79. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 241.
80. Defined by the Center report as fear ofjudicial reversal inducing a more thorough and pains-
taking review by the agency. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 139-40.
81. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 242.
82. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 146-47.
83. Id at 147.
84. Id at 148.
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might have to be organized in two tiers to provide adequate filter to the
high court and to affectuate more uniformity of outcomes at the initial
levels of the decision structure.85
Ogilvy states, as to the "corrective" function, that theoretically there
is no reason to believe that the special court judges, also operating
under the substantial evidence rule, will be willing to substitute their
own judgment for that of the ALJ in order to arrive at a correct "re-
sult".86 Whether "substituting their judgment" will lead to more "cor-
rect" decisions is somewhat questionable, but, as stated earlier, a Social
Security Court would appear to have a much better chance of at least
applying the substantial evidence rule in a more uniform manner.
As to decisional quality, the Center report states that, although dis-
trict court judges might generally be superior in ability, there would be
trade-offs as to the specialized court judges. The report emphasizes
that
[q]uality decision making depends on factors other than basic intellect
and training. Specialized experience may produce a surer grasp of
technical problems and also of the potential impact of any particular
decision on the general fabric of a program. Here [Social Security]
court .. review has a clear advantage over district court review.8'
INDEPENDENCE OF THE COURT
The legitimizing function of judicial review which the Center report
sees as having some uncertain value under the present system is of par-
ticular concern to Ogilvy as applied to the Social Security Court. He
states:
There also appears to be a real danger of institutional bias in favor of
the Social Security Administration. The members of the Court proba-
bly will be drawn, in large part, from the pool of past and present
Administrative Law Judges, Appeals Council Members, and Agency
officials who would undoubtedly tend to share the Secretary's outlook
with regard to most matters which would come before the Court. Fur-
thermore, since the judges are appointed by the President to perform a
specialist rather than a generalist function, it would be much easier to
appoint judges who share an administration's narrow concern with the
fiscal integrity of the trust fund, thereby assuring an anti-claimant bias
on the panel. The relative ease with which the Social Security Court
judges could be removed and the finite term of their appointments also
makes the Court more susceptible than Article III judges to pressures
and influences.
88
The Center report, however, seems to conclude that the problem of
85. Id at 149.
86. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 243-45.
87. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 149.
88. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 215-16.
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"policy bias" is of less concern than the effect that elements such as the
pressures of workload may have on independence. The report states:
Policy bias is not likely to be as important in SSA matters as it is in
many regulatory agencies. On that score, an independent reviewing
body seems relatively unimportant. Institutional bias, however, is an-
other matter. Given existing case-load pressures and the critical re-
sponsibility of ALJs to develop the record, an independent
counterwei ht to administrative pressure to produce seems peculiarly
important.9
In conclusion, the Center report states:
In our view, if a disability court is created, it should be made as much
like an Article III court as possible. Specialization should guard
against the inappropriate policy views sometimes imposed by a gener-
alist judiciary. Protection from institutional and policy bias can only
be assured by substantial independence from administrative and con-
gressional control.9"
The Center's recommendation that the court be as similar as possi-
ble to the Article III courts raise a number of issues. Although the
Social Security Court was generally patterned after the Tax Court, its
term is for ten years as opposed to fifteen years for the Tax Court. If
independence is to be emphasized perhaps a term at least as long as the
Tax Court should be authorized.
As Professor Harold Dubroff notes in his definitive history of the
Tax Court,9" when the Board of Tax Appeals was made a court in 1969,
one of the determinative factors in why it was constituted under Article
I rather than Article III of the Constitution was the question of the
judges' tenure. Dubroff recounts how Senator Long expressed the view
of many Congressmen in 1969 that Article III status to the Tax Court
might result in the judges' refusal to faithfully apply the tax laws.92
Another possible factor in the independence of the Court which is
not mentioned by Ogilvy is the method of selection of the chief judge.
Under the proposed legislation he would be selected by the President.
However, the tax court legislation provides that the Tax Court itself
"shall at least biennially designate a judge to act as chief judge."93 It
could be argued that perhaps this mechanism would provide more in-
dependence for Social Security Court than appointment by the Presi-
dent. On the other hand, the crucial functions of administering the
"conference" functions which will assure internal consistency might
suffer with such changing leadership. However, the professional sup-
port staff for the chief judge would presumably continue in place.
Some legal aid groups appearing before the subcommittee were
89. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 149.
90. Id at 150.
91. H. DUBROFF, supra note 29.
92. Id at 211-12.
93. I.R.C. § 7444(b) (1976).
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concerned about the quality and independence of the Social Security
Court. Eileen Sweeney testified:
Given that the vast majority of cases coming before the court will con-
cern disability claims, we are concerned that it may be difficult to at-
tract judges of the same caliber as those on the federal bench and that
lack of variety will result in such routinization of case review that the
court will eventually become nothing more than a 'rubber stamp' for
the Secretary; in effect a new Appeals Council.94
On the other hand, when the court was first proposed in the mid-1970's
reservations were expressed by SSA officials that it would take policy
making functions away from the Secretary. Interestingly, this view is
echoed by the comment of the Administrative Conference which is
printed in the 1982 hearings on H.R. 5700.91
Loren Smith, Chairman of the Conference, writes:
Furthermore, because one of the court's principal functions is to
create a body of precedential material governing subsequent SSA ac-
tions, there is a danger that the court may, by degrees, tend to fuse (or
confuse) its role with that of the Secretary.
Indeed, we perceive a subtle internal contradiction in the proposals
in H.R. 5700. On the other hand, the bill seeks to achieve greater uni-
formity and consistency in results through increased administrative
control. To this end section 7 of the bill gives increased emphasis to
the use of regulations of the Secretary and the other administrative
issuances to govern determinations at every level, while section 6 di-
rects the Secretary to review on his own motion at least 15% of the
decisions rendered in favor of claimants. We applaud this emphasis on
centralized management and control of the adjudicative process, which
is generally consistent with Part C of our recommendation. But while
sections 6 and 7 strengthen the role of the Secretary (acting, of course,
through the Social Security Administration and the Appeals Council),
section 12 weakens it, by establishing a specialized court with a man-
date to develop a body of precedents guiding administration of the So-
cial Security Act. A collision of these two principles of control seems
inevitable if the bill is enacted in its present form.
96
Formulation of policy and supervision of its uniform application at
all levels throughout the country would remain the primary responsi-
bility of the Secretary. Presumably the Social Security Court would
not intrude into this function any more or less than is currently done by
district and circuit courts. If it did establish case precedents which the
Secretary sees as contrary to what he considers appropriate policy, the
Social Security Court offers a better mechanism than the existing sys-
tem for pinpointing and highlighting the issues so that they may be
resolved by administrative or legislative action. The court is designed
94. Disability Amendments of 1982:- Hearings before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means on H. 5700 220 (1982).




neither as a rubber stamp for the Secretary nor as a vehicle to usurp his
policy making function.
Jurisdiction of the Court
The Social Security Court would, under H.R. 5700, have a broader
jurisdiction than under previous proposals, in that it would cover all
Title II issues including coverage and benefit eligibility and all such
issues for the Supplemental Security Income program. The social se-
curity caseloads are substantial and growing. The great preponderance
of these cases involve disability, but the balance of the cases would be
varied.
Ogilvy states that the Social Security Court leaves with the District
Courts some thirty five percent of the "Social Security" cases because
its jurisdiction does not include Medicare, Black Lung, and AFDC wel-
fare cases.9 7 However, the excluded cases constitute only three percent
of this broadened definition of Social Security cases9" and, therefore,
does not support his conclusion that "if workload relief is the goal of
the Social Security Court, the pending proposal does not achieve it."99
The Center report seems concerned about the limited nature of the ju-
risdiction of the court and the loss of the generalist outlook of judges in
such a specialized court. To accommodate this loss, the Center report
suggests that "[s]ome compromise might be effected by constructing a
broader disability court, which would hear SSA, VA, federal worker's
compensation, and perhaps some other claims. Alternatively, a
broader benefits court might be envisioned that would have jurisdiction
to review medical insurance, food stamps, and other federal benefits
determinations."'" Similarly, the Bork Committee recommended spe-
97. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 240.
98. According to the Office of U.S. Court in terms of cases commenced in the year ending June
1982 there were 8,002 disability insurance cases, 2,378 SSI cases (probably almost all disabil-
ity), 138 retirement and survivors, 461 health insurance, and 180 Black Lung. There were
also 1,653 characterized as "other". However, these cases were just those which some Dis-
trict Courts had not broken down into the above categories. The most recent statistics show






2. Black Lung 1
3. RSI 79
4. SSI (non-disability) 12
5. AFDC 6
6. Child Support I
TOTAL 4644
SOURCE: SOCIAL SECURITY MONTHLY LITIGATION REPORTS (March 1983)
There were also some 67 Medicare cases fied in the first three months in the Federal Courts
(General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services). The Black Lung, AFDC,
Child Support and health cases constitute less than two percent of total filings.
99. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 240.
100. CENTER REPORT, supra note 15, at 149.
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cialized tribunals of broader "welfare" jurisdiction than that proposed
in the Social Security Court:
These proposals avoid a major pitfall of comparable proposals, for
the administrative court would not be specialized by a single subject
matter. The administrative judge would be able to maintain a broad
perspective while developing increased familiarity and expertise in
dealing with administrative cases. In addition, the caseload would be
sufficiently general to attract judges of high caliber.'10
The jurisdiction of the Court could be extended over time if this is
desired. However, at least during the period the court was being estab-
lished it would appear that jurisdiction over all social security and SSI
cases would provide a sufficient challenge to the judges.
Appellate Review
Ogilvy notes that the new court proposal has the positive aspect of
limiting review to statutory and constitutional questions, and to one
court of appeals--the District of Columbia Circuit. 0 2 He notes that
this may limit workload and produce more "consistency" between
courts on principles. 10 3 He again reiterates his belief that there have
not been serious disagreements on the legal principles between the cir-
cuits and questions the wisdom of having only two courts below the
Supreme Court deal with a serious question of statutory interpreta-
tion."° Ogilvy's concern for the opportunity for several courts to con-
sider a question by drawing on and expanding upon the scholarly
considerations of prior decisions, 1 °5 must be balanced against the ad-
vantages of the potentially greater background and expertise a single
review court would develop in dealing with the social security law.
In this regard the history of the tax court may present some interest-
ing parallels. One of the arguments against creation of the tax court as
an Article III Court in the 1969 legislation was the lack of uniformity in
taxation case law which was coming out of the many forums in the
federal judiciary at that time. 0 6 Harold Dubroff writes:
The major concern of the Justice Department was that the entire
structure of the system by which tax disputes were litigated was sus-
pect. Tax cases could be tried in three separate systems of trial forums,
each with different procedures, attitudes and jurisdictional require-
ments. Appeals from the trial level courts could be taken to eleven
intermediate appellate tribunals, which frequently disagreed with one
another, and to a single court of final review which had a legendary
distaste for tax cases. In these circumstances the existing system was
101. THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMIT-
TEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 10.




106. H. DUBROFF, supra note 26, at 208-10.
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subject to criticism as being unfair to taxpayers, unfair to the Govern-
ment, and inconsistent with the goal of establishing a uniform and ra-
tional body of interpretations of the tax laws.'
0 7
Chief Justice Warren Burger has indicated that the Judicial Confer-
ence supports the general concept of a Social Security Court with judi-
cial review to the federal courts restricted to issues of constitutionality
and statutory interpretation. 08 The Conference believes, however, that
appellate review of Social Security Court decisions should be to the
various circuit courts because "it would increase the work-load for the
District of Columbia Circuit." ' 9 A possible alternative might be ap-
peal to the newly created "United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit." Some aspects of the legislative history of the new
"Federal Circuit" court would indicate that the hearing of social secur-
ity appeals might be an appropriate addition to its jurisdiction.10
The Supreme Court has been increasingly concerned about the
growing workload in the federal courts and how it affects the ability of
the high court to do its job."' One of the alternatives under active
discussion by the Justices seems to follow pretty closely what has been
outlined in the Social Security Court proposal.
The New York Times describes a suggestion by Justice White in the
following manner:
Questions on which the intermediate appeals courts disagree are
not necessarily momentous or in themselves worthy of the Supreme
Court's time. But the Court feels a special obligation to take such
cases, rather than tolerate a situation in which Federal law may mean
one thing in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in New York and the opposite in the Ninth Circuit in California.
About half the 180 or so cases the Court accepts each year involve
conflicts between two or more of the 12 Federal circuits. If the con-
flicts could be reduced, so could demands on the Court.
Justice White proposed that Congress create appeals courts and
give them nationwide jurisdiction over particular types of cases, an
idea that Justice Brennan said "surely is a suggestion worth exploring."
107. Id at 208-09.
108. In the year ending June 1981 there were 642 Social Security cases appealed to the circuit
courts while in 1982 this had increased to 779. This work-load is not evenly distributed. For
instance the 6th Circuit in 1981 had 150 cases (9% of its civil case work-load) while the 2nd
Circuit had 76 cases (3.5% of its civil case work-load). Only 12 cases were appealed to the
D.C. Circuit (2% of its civil work-load). ANNUAL REPORTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table B7.
109. Letter to J.J. Pickle, Chairman of the Social Security Subcommittee of the Ways and Means
Committee, August 13, 1982.
110. Pub. Law No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). This court would have jurisdiction over appeals of
suits against the government for damages or for the refund of income taxes, appeals from the
Court of International Trade, appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office, all Federal
contract appeals where the U.S. is a defendant and appeals from the Merit Appeals Protec-
tion Board. The legislative history emphasizes the new Court is not "a specialized Court"
and perhaps adding Social Security cases to its jurisdiction would be in keeping with this
philosophy. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1981).
111. See, eg., Rehnquist Becomes Sixth Justice to Warn of Growing Caseloads, Washington Post,
Sept. 24, 1982, at A3.
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Neither Justice specified types of cases, but presumably the courts
would handle questions arising under such complex Federal codes as
the tax or Social Security laws.'
1 2
COSTS AND WORKLOAD
Proponents of the Social Security Court have made no claims that
the creation of the court will yield cost savings, but Mr. Ogilvy states
that in this "era of cutbacks in government spending, the cost effective-
ness of a specialized court could mean the difference between adoption
and rejection, all other matters being equal."' ' The desirability of the
court, however, should not be decided on the basis of a few million
dollars in administrative costs. 114 One of the pervasive problems of the
disability insurance program in recent history has been a failure to pro-
vide adequate and timely resources to administer a program which
pays benefits totaling over eighteen billion dollars per year."
5
Ogilvy gives the Social Security Court high marks on the number of
judges available to speedily dispose of cases. 1 6 He presents an inter-
esting analysis of the amount of time needed by district court judges to
do social security cases and applies these to a twenty judge Social Se-
curity Court. He states that according to the figures he uses, a great
deal of leeway is indicated before the twenty judges would be over-
worked.' '7 He states that at "a continuing level of about 9,000 social
security cases per year, the judges would be responsible for 450 cases
each.""' One cannot assume, however, that the 1980 statistics of 9,000
filings will continue, in fact, filings had increased to almost 13,000 in
1982 and will probably pass 15,000 this year.' '9 Perhaps there should
be a re-examination of the number of judges provided by the legisla-
tion in view of these changed circumstances.
112. Justice Speaking Out On Reducing Their Caseload, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1982, at A24.
113. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 240.
114. Ogilvy states that the cost of "care and feeding" of the new Court would be $10 million a
year. Its salary scale is slightly below that for District Courts but there would certainly be
start-up costs. Id
115. Also about $8 billion goes out in SSI-Disability benefits a year. The Social Security actuaries
have pointed to this "penny-wise pound foolish" thinking as follows:
During this period (1971-74), administrative expenses remained almost level,
while practically every other measure of the size of the DI program was increasing
rapidly. Furthermore, a similar decline did not occur during this period in the ratio
of administrative expense to benefit payments for the OASI program, to which the
same benefit increases applied. In our opinion, the sharp decline in the ratio for the
DI program was due to ill-advised budgetary decisions which kept administrative
costs and personnel levels down but which resulted in a concomitant explosion in the
number of benefits awarded during the period. (Actuarial Note No. 101, Nov. 1980,
at 8).
Chairman Pickle of the Social Security Subcommittee has made numerous pleas to the
Appropriations Committee to provide adequate budget resources for the State agencies and
the AL's, with particular emphasis on quality assurance and money to purchase medical
examinations for the better documentation of cases.
116. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 246.
117. Id at 246-47.
118. Id
119. Supra note 4.
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ALTERNATIVES TO A SOCIAL SECURITY COURT
Mr. Ogilvy presents a number of alternatives which he says may
accomplish the joint goals of judicial review and decreased judicial
workload more effectively "than a radical shift" to a special court. 2 '
Elimination or Stricter Standard of Review
It can be reasonably argued that a Social Security Court would pre-
vent the more "radical" shifts which are presented as Ogilvy's first two
alternatives-namely the elimination of judicial review and the re-
placement of the substantial evidence rule with a standard of "arbitrary
and capricious."1 21 Although presented as viable alternatives, Ogilvy
does not take them seriously. He cites the Center report to support his
contention that the values of judicial review "militate against such a
radical departure from the norm."'
' 22
The Social Security Court proposal rejects neither judicial review
nor the substantial evidence rule. It holds out the promise of a more
universal application of the traditional view of the substantial evidence
rule, however, and promises more control over what some people con-
sider abuses of the authority to remand. Such a change would go a
long way to silence those who advocate the elimination or curtailment
of judicial review.
Clearer or Stricter Eligibility Standard
Ogilvy's third alternative appears to be another straw man which he
strikes down. Under the subheading of "Congressional Alterna-
tives," ' 23 he cites a number of proposals affecting the definition of disa-
bility which have come before the Ways and Means Committee in
recent years, including the Reagan Administration's recommendation
in 1981 to base eligibility for disability benefits on the medical factors
alone.'24 In the 1980 Amendments and in the 1982 proposals, there
was a conscious effort by Ways and Means not to change the definition
of disability but rather to concentrate on seeing that the current one
was administered on a uniform basis. 125 The Ways and Means Com-
mittee also intended to see how the vocational grid regulations, dis-
cussed by Ogilvy under the subheading "Administrative Alternatives,"
affected the program before any legislative change in the definition of
120. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 247.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 248.
124. Id at 248 n.106.
125. Supra note 20. A partial exception to this was the provision in H.R. 6181 providing criteria
for the evaluation of pain. As stated earlier this was deemed necessary because of inconsis-
tent Court decisions which presumably would not exist under a Social Security Court.
Ogilvy also notes the evaluation of pain provision as an illustration of this type of alterna-
tive, but doubts that it "cures any perceived misinterpretations of the Act." Ogilvy, supra
note 6, at 249 n.109.
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disability was made. Ogilvy's enthusiasm about the grid regulations
seems somewhat restrained, however, since twice in his article he states
that it remains to be seen whether any real improvement will result.'
26
Modified Reconsideration Process
Ogilvy notes that for at least ten years the SSA has experimented
with the proposition of introducing "face-to-face" contact at the recon-
sideration level and that it is conceivable "that involving the claimant
at an earlier stage will increase client satisfaction and decrease incen-
tive to appeal."' 27 In the closing minutes of the 97th Congress, Con-
gress approved legislation which would bring about "face-to-face"
contact at the reconsideration level in termination cases.128 Although it
is to be hoped that this will bring about more uniformity and credibility
in the early stages of the process, such a change would have neither an
immediate nor substantial effect on the problems which exist at the
court level.
Other Agency Options
Ogilvy suggests that the SSA should appeal more court decisions,
issue more rulings, and publish more Appeals Council decisions which
have precedential value. Consistency in case law can be achieved in a
much more timely and rational manner, however, under a Social Se-
curity Court system. The SSA is in the process of promulgating rulings
which will provide uniform guidelines for adjudicating disability.
29
This effort should promote uniformity between the state agencies and
126. Id at 235, 249.
127. Id at 249-50.
128. H.R. 7093, 97th Cong., signed on January 12, 1983, P.L. 97-455, § 2-7, 96 Stat. 2498-2502.
H.R. 6181 the more comprehensive amendment to the disability program which had been
approved by Ways and Means earlier in 1982 contained this provision coupled with a propo-
sal to partially "close the record" at the reconsideration level in termination cases. The latter
provision did not appear in H.R. 7093. The Ways and Means report on H.R. 6181 states:
Face-to-face contact at reconsideration is probably one of the most studied ideas for
improving the appeals process. Its adoption has been supported a number of times in
the past by the Social Security Administration, but never implemented. For instance,
in the Social Security Subcommittee's 1979 hearings on disability insurance Secretary
Califano said he was instituting such a proceeding as part of the administrative action
he was taking to implement disability program reform. The principle rationale for
face-to-face at reconsideration has been the idea that it might enhance claimant ac-
ceptance of the denial at the State agency level and reduce the number of appeals.
Your Committee believes that face-to-face at reconsideration might also be a useful
step in reducing the disparity in adjudication between the AL~s and the State agencies
since this is one of the major differences between the procedures at these levels. The
past experiments with face-to-face generally show a higher level of allowance and
lower level of appeals resulting from the procedure. The real issue is whether face-to-
face at reconsideration leads to better decision-making and enhanced respect for the
system by applicants. This provision in the bill will provide a real test as to the effec-
tiveness and fairness of a face-to-face reconsideration and the closing of the record,
and if it proves successful it could, over time, be extended to the reconsideration pro-
cess of initial claims.
H.R. R P. No. 588, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982).
129. See supra note 16.
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the AL's but would not necessarily reduce the number of appeals to
the district courts or reduce their proclivities for making varied inter-
pretations of the law. Ogilvy states that high rates of reversal "tend to
encourage appeals; conversely, more uniform decisions within the
agency should result in fewer requests for judicial review."'130 On the
other hand, some might argue that a reduced reversal rate at the ALJ
level-now substantially over fifty percent-opens up an additional
population for appeal to the courts.
Judicial Alternatives
Ogilvy states that the district courts can expand the use of magis-
trates to meet workload problems.13' The use of magistrates varies
markedly from district to district and has only increased by about 500
cases a year in the period from 1978 to 1982.132 If this mechanism is to
play a major role in meeting social security workload problems, a spe-
cial court would seem to be a more effective position to implement this
decision on a national basis.
130. Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 250.
131. Id at 250-51.
132. See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 62.
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